Discussion
• Control actions need to be assessed by extension of Thomas* for contextual information
• E.g. Steering or Acceleration can only be hazardous in a certain context which describes the environment
• Previous contribution** shows 108 environment scenes by nearly binary discretization
• Valid abstraction in complex environments is necessary to assess control actions
Unmanned protective vehicle
• Level 4 Automation on public roads
• Reduced environment and speed
• Application of ISO 26262 development process
• Four operating modes:
• Manual mode
• Safe halt
• Follow mode
• Coupled mode
Control structure
• Top-level structure with cascaded control loop
• Fast (inner) control loop for vehicle dynamics (20 ms)
• Slow (outer) control loop for vehicle in environment (100ms)
Accidents & Hazards
• A-1 AFA collides with moving traffic during unmanned operation.
• A-2 AFA collides with leading vehicle.
• A-3 AFA collides with solid obstacle on hard shoulder.
• A-4 AFA collides with vulnerable obstacle on hard shoulder.
• A-5 AFA collides with embankment.
• A-6 AFA collides with moving traffic during manual operation.
• H-1 AFA leaves hard shoulder to the left / right.
• H-2 AFA drives too close to leading vehicle.
• H-3 AFA does not react to path-blocking object.
• H-4 AFA performs unintended braking / steering / acceleration.
• H-5 AFA stops on on-/ off-ramp.
• H-6 AFA operates in follow mode on on-/ off-ramps.
• H-7 AFA operates unmanned at forbidden weather conditions.
• H-8 AFA operates unmanned on too narrow hard shoulder. • Operating mode changes with additional 72 contexts * J.Thomas, "Extending and automating a systems-theoretic hazard analysis for requirements generation and analysis", PhD thesis, 2013
